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On	Climate	Matters:	Offsetting,	Population,	&	Justice1	
	
Elizabeth	Cripps	
	
[Forthcoming	in	Midwest	Studies	in	Philosophy]	
	
In	Climate	Matters	 (2012),	 John	Broome	defends	 a	 stringent	 individual	 duty	of	
justice	 to	 reduce	one’s	 net	 carbon	 footprint	 to	 zero.	He	 argues,	moreover,	 that	
this	 can	 be	 fulfilled	 without	 radical	 lifestyle	 changes,	 by	 offsetting.	 These	 are	
provocative	and,	in	their	different	ways,	likely	to	be	unpopular	claims.	However,	
this	paper	will	argue	that	Broome’s	conclusions	are	less	controversial,	in	two	key	
ways,	 than	 they	 might	 be.	 On	 offsetting	 and	 on	 the	 ethics	 of	 adding	 people,	
Broome’s	own	arguments	lead	further	than	he	explicitly	goes.	One	of	these	would	
put	him	in	extremely	problematic	territory;	both	serve	to	highlight	an	underlying	
difficulty	with	his	account	of	the	moral	situation	of	the	individual	emitter.		
For	Broome,	 individual	 emissions	 cause	harm.	 If	 you	 live	a	 ‘normal’	 life	 in	a	
rich	country,	‘your	lifetime	emissions	will	wipe	out	[very	roughly]	more	than	six	
months	of	healthy	human	life’	(2012:	74).	This	loss	is	spread	across	the	millions	
of	 victims	 of	 climate	 change,	 so	 thinly	 that	 the	 difference	 any	 given	 emitter	
makes	 to	 each	victim	 is	 imperceptible.	However,	 it	 adds	up	across	 the	 victims.	
Moreover,	 each	 contribution	 combines	with	 those	of	 billions	 of	 other	 emitters,	
resulting	in	very	great	suffering	by	very	many	people.	Since	it	is	wrong	to	harm	
others,	each	of	us	has	a	clear-cut	duty	to	reduce	our	net	emissions	to	zero.	This	is	
a	duty	of	justice2	and	takes	priority	over	many	other	duties.	In	particular,	it	takes	
priority	over	duties	of	goodness		–	duties	‘to	try	and	improve	the	world’	(2012:	
50)	 –	 which,	 in	 the	 climate	 change	 case,	 are	 duties	 to	 put	 pressure	 on	 our	
																																																								
1	Thanks	to	Holly	Lawford-Smith	and	Paul	Bou-Habib	for	detailed	comments	on	this	paper.	It	has	
also	 benefited	 from	 feedback	 at	 a	 Climate	 Matters	workshop,	 University	 of	 Essex,	 November	
2014,	especially	from	John	Broome.	I	am	also	grateful	to	Bou-Habib,	organiser	of	the	workshop,	
the	editors	of	Midwest	Studies	in	Philosophy,	and	of	course	Broome	himself	for	this	opportunity	to	
comment	 on	 a	 work	 as	 practically	 important	 and	 politically	 timely	 as	 it	 is	 philosophically	
engaging.	
2	Duties	‘owed	by	one	person	to	another	particular	person,	or…	people’	(Broome	2012:	52).	
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governments	to	act	(2012:	81).	(Governments,	unlike	individuals,	have	primarily	
duties	of	goodness	to	tackle	the	overall	problem	(2012:	64-68).3)	
At	this	stage,	the	affluent	reader	might	be	feeling	rather	uncomfortable.	But	it	
turns	out	that	fulfilling	this	stringent	individual	duty	is	considerably	easier	than	
we	might	 fear.	 According	 to	 Broome,	 individuals	 can	 fulfil	 this	 duty	 of	 justice	
either	by	cutting	their	own	emissions	or	by	bringing	about	comparable	emissions	
reductions	 elsewhere.	 This	 might	 be	 by	 carbon	 removal	 or	 preventative	
offsetting.	 This	 latter	 involves	 funding	 projects	 to	 reduce	 others’	 emissions,	
perhaps	exploiting	energy	efficiency	technology	(2012:	87-89).		
This	 option,	 which	 allows	 affluent	 individuals	 to	 ‘buy’	 themselves	 out	 of	
changing	 their	 habits,	 raises	 objections	 enough.4	 However,	 these	 are	 not	 the	
focus	 of	 this	 paper.	 Instead,	 I	 argue	 that	 in	 defending	 preventative	 offsetting,	
Broome	opens	the	door	to	other	ways	of	‘cancelling	out’	one’s	own	emissions:	by	
funding	 green	 technology	 research,	 by	 promoting	 climate	 change-mitigating	
action	in	other	ways,	or	–	possibly	–	by	funding	adaptation	(Section	I).	Moreover,	
on	 his	 account	 of	 un-offset	 individual	 emissions	 as	 individual	 injustices,	 the	
decision	to	have	a	child	is	also	an	injustice	(Section	II).	Finally,	(Section	III)	I	will	
question	 Broome’s	 characterisation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 individual	
emitters	 and	 the	 collective	 harm	done	 through	 climate	 change.	 Given	 that	 any	
perceptible	 harm	 to	 victims	 results	 from	 the	 combination	 of	 many	 individual	
emissions,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 individuals	 have	 an	 exclusive	 or	 primary	duty	 of	
justice	to	stop	or	negate	their	individual	emissions,	rather	than	try	to	bring	about	
a	collective-level	change,	nor	–	if	they	do	–	why	such	duties	should	automatically	
take	priority	over	duties	of	goodness.	 In	 concluding,	 I	will	briefly	 indicate	how	
loosening	 these	 assumptions	 can	 reinforce	 the	 expanded	 account	 of	 offsetting,	
and	take	some	of	the	sting	out	of	concerns	about	the	implications	for	individual	
procreative	decision-making.	
	
																																																								
3	Although	they	also	have	obligations	of	justice,	Broome	sees	these	as	limited,	in	the	climate	
change	case,	by	the	non-identity	problem.	His	claim	is	that	governments	do	not	harm	future	
individuals	through	high	emissions	policies,	because	without	those	policies	those	particular	
individuals	would	not	come	into	existence	(2012:	61-63).	However,	this	paper	will	focus	on	his	
treatment	of	individuals	and	so	barely	touch	on	his	also	significant	contribution	to	the	debate	on	
governmental	climate	duties.	
4	E.g.	Hyams	and	Fawcett	2013;	Jamieson	2014;	Sagoff	2014;	Spiekermann	2013.	 
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I. OFFSETTING	
	
	
As	we	have	seen,	Broome	thinks	each	of	us	has	an	 individual	duty	of	 justice	 to	
achieve	zero	net	carbon	footprint,	which	we	can	fulfil	by	offsetting.	This	can	take	
two	 forms:	 removing	 equivalent	 carbon	 from	 the	 atmosphere,	 for	 example	 by	
planting	 trees,	 or	 preventing	 equivalent	 emissions	 elsewhere,	 for	 example	 by	
funding	 renewable	 energy	 projects	 in	 the	 developing	world	 (2012:	 85-89).	 To	
reiterate,	 I	will	not	debate	whether	 it	 is	morally	acceptable	 to	offset	at	all,	 and	
particularly	 whether	 it	 is	 so	 to	 use	 preventative	 offsetting,	 rather	 than	 make	
lifestyle	changes.		
Rather,	 this	 section	makes	a	 conditional	point:	 if	 preventative	offsetting	 is	 a	
legitimate	 way	 to	 fulfil	 this	 stringent	 duty	 of	 individual	 justice,	 so	 too	 –	
potentially	–	are	three	other	courses	of	action.	The	first	 is	offsetting	by	funding	
research	into	‘green’	technology.	The	second	is	offsetting	by	promoting	action	on	
mitigation.	This	could	 involve:	a)	direct,	personal	 influence	on	the	emissions	of	
individuals	 or	 small	 groups	 close	 to	 you	 or	 b)	 influencing	 government	 or	
international	policy.	The	third	is	offsetting	by	funding	adaptation.	
Briefly,	the	reasoning	on	the	first	two	is	as	follows.	If	it	is	acceptable	to	offset	
individual	emissions	by	funding	the	use	of	‘green’	technology	to	reduce	emissions	
elsewhere,	 why	 not	 also	 by	 making	 more	 such	 technology	 available,	 bringing	
about	further	cuts?	Equally,	if	it	is	justifiable	to	continue	your	own	carbon-laden	
lifestyle	so	long	you	fund	other	people	to	emit	less,	why	not	if	you	can	persuade	
others	to	emit	less,	or	bring	about	policy	changes	to	require	everyone	to	do	so?	
On	offsetting	by	adaptation,	the	argument	rests	on	the	fact	that	there	is	more	
than	one	way	of	protecting	persons	from	climate	change:	curbing	the	emissions	
that	 cause	 the	 physical	 changes	 to	 the	 atmosphere	 (mitigation)	 or	 adapting	
humans	 and	 their	 environment	 so	 that	 such	 warming	 would	 not	 undermine	
central	interests.5	At	the	collective	level,	both	of	these	are	necessary	(e.g.	Caney	
2009:	 86-89).	 However,	 for	 current	 purposes	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 individual	
emitter:	it	is	the	ultimate	harm	to	victims	doing	the	moral	work	for	Broome,	so	if	
that	harm	is	prevented,	why	isn’t	this	an	acceptable	way	of	offsetting?	
																																																								
5	A	third	possibility,	geoengineering,	is	not	discussed	here.		
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Suppose,	by	way	of	analogy,	I	want	to	throw	loud	Friday	night	parties	but	the	
noise	would	distress	my	neighbour.	To	avoid	injustice,	I	could	refrain	altogether.	
If	like	Broome	we	accept	the	legitimacy	of	preventative	offsetting,	I	could	throw	
my	parties	but	pay	the	students	living	on	my	neighbour’s	other	side	from	holding	
the	even	louder	ones	that	they	would	otherwise	have	had	every	Saturday	night.6	
Finally,	 I	 could	 soundproof	 my	 walls.7	 If	 anything,	 the	 third	 option	 looks	 less	
morally	dubious	than	the	second.	The	analogy	to	the	third,	in	the	emissions	case,	
is	adaptation.	
There	are	major	objections	 to	 this	 three-fold	expansion	of	offsetting.8	These	
are	 uncertain	methods.	 How	 can	 the	 individual	 be	 sure	 (or	 sure	 enough)	 that	
sufficient	harm	will	be	prevented?	Even	if	it	is,	will	it	be	prevented	to	exactly	the	
same	 people	 as	 our	 individual	 emissions	 would	 have	 harmed?	 An	 individual	
cannot	generally	justify	harming	person	A	by	benefiting	person	B.	Indeed,	at	first	
sight,	the	suggestions	might	look	not	only	problematic,	but	morally	outrageous.	
The	parallel	would	be	with	geoengineering,	where	Stephen	Gardiner	(2013:	22-
24)	compares	us,	as	a	generation,	with	‘Wayne’.	Wayne	continually	cheats	on	his	
wife,	exposing	her	to	risk	of	STDs.	He	attempts	to	justify	this	by	investing	a	few	
dollars	 in	 a	 company	attempting	 to	 cure	HIV:	 a	 very	 risky	 enterprise	 that	may	
not	succeed	in	producing	a	cure	at	all,	 let	alone	in	one	which	can	save	his	wife.	
And	if	this	looks	problematically	speculative,	how	much	more	so	does	appeal	to	
an	 individual’s	 chance	 of	 influencing	 either	 policy	 or	 other	 individuals	 to	 cut	
emissions	sufficiently	to	cancel	out	her	own	carbon	footprint?	
In	 response,	 I	would	 reiterate	 that	my	 claim	 is	 strictly	 conditional:	 not	 that	
these	are	 acceptable	ways	 to	 fulfil	 strict	 individual	 duties	 of	 justice,	 but	 that	 if	
preventative	offsetting	 is	a	 legitimate	response	 to	emissions	harms,	 there	 is	no	
principled	 reason	 not	 to	 go	 further.	 With	 this	 in	 mind,	 let	 us	 begin	 with	 the	
general	 worry	 about	 uncertainty.	 As	 Broome	 acknowledges,	 preventative	
																																																								
6	I	am,	of	course,	making	certain	assumptions:	that	my	neighbour	makes	no	difference	between	
Friday	and	Saturday	nights	and	that	the	students	put	a	lower	value	on	being	deprived	of	
entertainment,	perhaps	because	they	are	poorer.	(Precisely	this	latter	point	brings	out	part	of	the	
moral	unease	associated	with	offsetting.	See	e.g.	Caney	(2010:	203-12)	on	emissions	trading.)	
7	 I	 could	 also	 try	 to	 compensate	 my	 neighbour.	 Broome	 seems	 prepared	 to	 countenance	
compensation	 as	 a	means	 of	 fulfilling	 duties	 of	 justice	 (2012:	 56-57,	 78-81).	 However	 this,	 in	
moral	terms,	looks	second	best,	just	as	it	does	at	the	collective	level,	though	it	will	undoubtedly	
be	necessary	as	part	of	a	fair	collective	response	(Caney	2009:	86-89).			
8	A	preliminary	difficulty	is	that	of	calculating	likely	reductions,	but	this	is	not	unique	to	my	
suggestions	(Broome	2012:	85,	89).	
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offsetting	may	also	be	ineffective.	He	advocates	overestimating	what	is	required,	
to	be	on	the	safe	side	(2012:	87-9).	Indeed,	even	carbon	removal	offsetting	is	not	
certain	to	bring	about	exactly	the	necessary	reduction	in	emissions.	Rather	than	
a	 clear	 contrast	 between	 options	 –	 a	 straightforward	 cancelling	 out	 of	 one’s	
emissions,	on	the	one	hand,	and	uncertainty	about	whether	one	had	done	so,	on	
the	other	–	we	are	faced	with	a	continuum	along	which	there	are	different	levels	
of	uncertainty	attached	to	different	offsetting	options.	The	only	certainty	 is	not	
emitting	in	the	first	place.	Thus,	rather	than	ruling	out	some	means	of	offsetting	
altogether,	 an	 appropriate	 response	might	 be	 to	 overestimate	more	 and	more	
what	is	needed,	as	one	moves	further	along	the	spectrum.9	
There	 are,	 moreover,	 a	 number	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 offsetting	 by	 green	
technology	 research	 and	 by	 promotion	 can	 be	 made	 more	 or	 less	 uncertain,	
while	offsetting	by	adaptation,	 like	preventative	offsetting,	could	be	a	matter	of	
funding	 the	use	of	established	 technology.	With	green	 technology	research,	 the	
individual	 could	 spread	her	 investment,	 provided	 it	 is	 significant	 enough,	 over	
different	projects.		
On	offsetting	by	promotion,	the	objection	would	be	that	most	individuals	are	
highly	 unlikely	 to	 make	 any	 real	 difference	 to	 policy,	 try	 as	 they	 might	 by	
subscribing	to	Greenpeace	or	Friends	of	the	Earth,	signing	e-petitions,	marching	
on	 international	 summits,	 and	 so	 on.	 However,	 some	 individuals	do	 have	 very	
great	 influence,	 with	 a	 potential	 impact	 much	 more	 than	 equivalent	 to	 a	
lifetime’s	 individual	 emissions.	 (Whether	 they	 could	 achieve	 this	 in	 practice	
without	 cutting	 their	 own	 emissions	 is,	 of	 course,	 another	 question:	 there	
remains	the	danger	that	 they	will	be	perceived	to	be	hypocritical,	undermining	
their	 efforts	 (Cripps	 2013:	 152-3).)	 True,	 many	 of	 those	 have	 this	 influence	
because	they	hold	positions	of	power	 in	current	state	or	 interstate	 institutions,	
and	as	such	should	be	considered	separately	from	private	individuals.	But	not	all	
those	with	potentially	enormous	influence	are	currently	involved	in	government.	
Some	have	become	role	models	for	other	reasons	and	could	change	behaviour	on	
such	a	mass	scale	as	 indirectly	to	change	policy.	Others	 lead	non-governmental	
																																																								
9	This	could	be	very	costly,	giving	no	incentive	for	individuals	to	do	it.	However,	it	is	worth	
establishing	in	theory	whether	other	means	of	offsetting	could	satisfy	individual	duties	of	justice,	
because	carbon	removal	or	preventative	offsetting	could	become	more	expensive	and	individual	
emission	cuts	harder.	
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organisations	 such	 as	 corporations	 or	 religious	 organisations.	 It	 is	 not	 so	
straightforward	to	draw	a	neat	line	between	‘powerless’	individuals,	on	the	one	
hand,	and	all-powerful	governments,	on	the	other.		
Recall,	too,	that	there	are	two	levels	of	offsetting	by	promotion.	Anyone	with	
influence	 on	 relatively	 small	 groups	 of	 others	 –	 teachers,	 local	 community	
leaders,	 journalists	 –	 might	 be	 able	 to	 ‘cancel	 out’	 their	 own	 emissions	 by	
provoking	 emissions	 cuts	 by	 those	 others,	 or	 at	 local	 policy	 level.	 (Again,	 of	
course,	subject	to	the	perceived	hypocrisy	objection.)	
Let	 us	 turn,	 then,	 to	 the	 second	worry:	 even	 if	 the	 same	amount	 of	 harm	 is	
prevented,	 it	may	not	be	harm	to	the	same	people.	Depriving	one	person	of	six	
months	of	life	cannot	be	justified	by	prolonging	another’s	life	by	six	months.	(On	
the	common	sense	morality	upheld	by	Broome,	it	cannot	be	justified	by	giving	six	
months	 to	 ten	 others.)	 But	 why	 should	 this	 apply	 more	 to	 offsetting	 by	
technology	 research	 or	 promotion	 than	 to	 preventative	 offsetting?	 The	 idea	
behind	preventative	offsetting	is	that	one	can	spare	the	victims	and	so	fulfil	one’s	
duty	 of	 justice	 by	 cancelling	 out	 one’s	 own	 emissions	 through	 reductions	
elsewhere.	These	two	are	simply	alternative	ways	of	doing	that.		
If	 the	concern	 is	with	those	who	could	be	harmed	as	a	result	of	 the	time	 lag	
between	 individual	 emissions	 and	 any	 offsetting	 reduction,	 this	 is	 a	 serious	
worry,	but	one	which	is	not	unique	to	my	proposals.	The	same	applies	to	many	
kinds	 of	 preventative	 offsetting	 (some	projects	will	 have	 a	 very	 long	 gestation	
period)	 and	may	 not	 –	 if	 one’s	 influence	 on	 others	 is	 rapid	 enough	 –	 apply	 to	
some	kinds	of	offsetting	by	promotion.	If	I	could	get	away	with	it,	I	could	give	a	
rousing	talk	one	afternoon	which	prompted	twenty	regular	commuters	to	ditch	
their	 cars	 for	 bikes,	 then	 fly	 off	 to	 the	 South	 of	 France	 on	 holiday,	 safe	 in	 the	
knowledge	that	my	day	had	reduced	emissions	by	more	than	it	had	increased	it.	
(Again,	remember	that	I	am	not	defending	this,	all-things-considered,	but	simply	
pointing	out	that	it	 is	another	way	of	ensuring	that,	for	any	emissions	I	cause,	I	
also	cause	an	equivalent	or	greater	reduction	elsewhere.)	
On	 offsetting	 by	 adaptation,	 however,	 there	 are	 some	 more	 specific	
difficulties.	The	idea	behind	the	other	options	is	that	so	long	so	you	don’t	cause	
extra	 overall	 emissions	 in	 the	 atmosphere,	 no-one	 will	 be	 harmed	 by	 your	
actions.	 Here,	 the	 suggestion	 is,	 instead,	 that	 the	 individual	 could	 somehow	
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intervene	 to	 shield	 victims	 from	 the	 physical	 changes	 associated	 with	 any	
increased	 emissions.	 But	 she	 can	 hardly	 be	 sure	 that	 those	 people	 whom	 her	
adaptation	 aid	 protects	 will	 be	 the	 same	 ones	 whom	 her	 emissions	 will	 have	
harmed.	
I	 have	 some	 responses	 to	 this	worry,	 but	 they	may	 remain	 inadequate	until	
supplemented	 by	 Section	 III.	 Firstly,	 preventative	 offsetting	 is	 not	 entirely	
immune	 to	 such	 difficulties.	 Even	 allowing	 for	 overestimating	 in	 response	 to	
uncertainty	 about	whether	 emissions	will	 be	 reduced	 enough	 elsewhere,	 some	
harm	 to	 some	 victims	 could	 still	 slip	 through	 the	 net.	 This	 is	 because	 of	 a	
combination	of	potential	time	lags	and	the	impossibility	of	being	certain	one	has	
overestimated	 sufficiently.	 In	 other	 words,	 accepting	 even	 preventative	
offsetting	means	not	assigning	absolute	priority	to	ensuring	that	no	victims	are	
left	harmed	a	result	of	your	actions.10		
Indeed,	 taking	 concerns	 about	 time	 lags	 to	 their	 natural	 conclusions,	
adaptation	 might	 be	 the	 closest	 some	 polluters	 can	 get	 to	 negating	 their	 own	
emissions.	Consider	those	who	are	now	elderly	and	have	been	emitting	all	their	
life.	What	 would	 Broome’s	 justice	 require	 of	 them?	 This	 is	 not	 clear,	 but	 it	 is	
reasonable	to	assume	that	he	would	think	they	should	offset	all	past	emissions.	
However,	some	victims	already	live	with	the	effects	of	climate	change.	The	early,	
un-offset	emissions	of	those	still	living	could	have	contributed	to	this,	and	it	is	a	
suffering	which	cannot	now	be	prevented	by	mitigation	but	might	be	eased	by	
adaptation	aid.	(Taking	this	further,	compensation	aid	could	be	required,	where	
central	interests	have	already	been	undermined.)	
Finally,	what	 each	 individual	 causes	 are	 imperceptible	harms	 to	 each	 of	 the	
many	victims	of	 climate	 change,	 rather	 than	perceptible	 losses	 caused	by	 each	
emitter	 to	 any	 given	 individuals.	 This,	 I	 suggest,	 could	 justify	 responding	 by	
spreading	 adaptation	 aid	 also	 across	 as	 many	 as	 possible.	 But	 this	 relies	 to	
arguments	that	will	not	be	filled	out	until	Section	III.	
This	 completes,	 for	 now,	my	discussion	 of	 offsetting.	 It	might	 seem	 that	my	
conditional	 claim	 –	 if	 preventative	 offsetting	 is	 an	 acceptable	 way	 to	 fulfil	
individual	duties	of	 justice,	so	 too	are	 these	other	speculative	ways	of	stepping	
																																																								
10	Broome	does	not	rule	out	a	‘surrogate	compensation’	approach,	compensating	large	numbers	of	people	as	
a	proxy	for	those	actually	harmed	(2012:	80-81).	This	would	be	vulnerable	to	the	same	objection.	
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between	one’s	 emissions	and	harm	–	 	 is	ultimately	a	 case	against	preventative	
offsetting:	almost	a	reductio	ad	absurdum.	But	my	aim	is	at	once	less	destructive	
and	more	critical	than	that.	Section	III	will	identify	some	limitations	of	Broome’s	
account	of	 the	connection	between	 individual	duty-bearers	and	 the	harm	done	
by	 climate	 change.	 These	 accepted,	 I	 will	 suggest	 that	 at	 least	 some	 of	 my	
suggestions	 could	 be	 as	 appropriate	 a	 response	 to	 carbon	 emissions	 as	 –	 and	
arguably	more	 appropriate	 than	 –	 cutting	 one’s	 own	 carbon	 footprint,	 even	by	
conventional	means.	 For	 now,	 however,	 I	 turn	 to	 a	 second	way	 in	which	what	
Broome	explicitly	says	about	 individual	climate	duties	stops	short	of	where	his	
own	arguments	should	take	him.	
	
II.	THE	INJUSTICE	OF	ADDING	PEOPLE		
	
Broome	is	adamant	that	parents	should	not	expect	others	to	pick	up	the	tab	for	
their	decision	to	have	children	(2012:	71-72).	My	contention,	taking	him	into	still	
more	controversial	territory,11	is	that	he	is	committed	to	condemning	voluntary,	
foreseeable	procreation	as	an	injustice.	In	having	a	child,	parents	create	not	only	
a	 new	 person,	 with	 her	 own	 emissions,	 but	 the	 prospect	 of	 a	 whole	 line	 of	
descendants,	all	emitting.		
A	number	of	objections	are	likely.	One	is	that	parents	do	not	harm	so	long	as	
they	have	fewer	than	replacement	rate	children.	However,	Broome	requires	zero	
carbon	 footprint,	 not	 merely	 keeping	 below	 some	 ‘fair	 share’	 emissions	
threshold	(2012:	79).	Moreover,	even	 if	parents	have	only	one	or	two	children,	
the	 stage	 of	 life	 at	which	 they	have	 them	affects	 total	 emissions:	 the	more	 the	
overlap	 between	 generations,	 the	 greater	 the	 impact.	 Thus,	 on	 Broome’s	 own	
account,	 there	 are	 reasons	 to	 reject	 this	 objection.	 Even	 accepting	 it,	 however,	
the	argument	would	hold	for	more	than	replacement	rate	children.	(This	is	a	less	
counterintuitive	conclusion,	although	one	still	likely	to	raise	hackles.)	
A	 second	 objection	 is	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 not	 having	 children	 is	 too	 great	 to	
require	 anyone	 to	 refrain.	 A	 parent’s	 relationship	 with	 her	 child	 can	 make	 a	
central	 contribution	 to	 a	 full	 human	 life:	 one	 not	 substitutable	 by	 other	 goods	
																																																								
11	Controversial,	but	not	altogether	uncharted,	e.g.	Young	(2001).	
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(e.g.	Brighouse	and	Swift	2006;	Conly	2005).	Thus,	to	ask	someone	to	give	up	the	
opportunity	could	be	to	demand	a	huge	sacrifice.12		
However,	on	 the	strict	common	sense	morality	on	which	Broome	draws,	we	
must	not	(as	individuals)	do	serious	harm	even	if	the	cost	to	us	of	avoiding	it	is	
high.	 He	 specifies	 that	 ‘[j]ustice	 does	 not	 prohibit	 you	 from	 doing	 harms	 you	
cannot	help’	(2012:	59)	but	most	of	us,	at	 least	 in	the	affluent	world,	can	 ‘help’	
having	children,	albeit	at	an	emotional	cost.	I	would	not	generally	be	justified	in	
cutting	off	your	arm	even	if	that	were	the	only	way	to	save	my	own.13		
If	 our	 intuitions	 pull	 against	 such	 a	 hard	 line	 in	 cases	 like	 climate	 change,	
where	the	harm	results	from	the	combination	of	many	actions	none	of	which	do	
perceptible	harm	on	their	own,	then	perhaps	we	have	reason	to	doubt	whether	
such	 contributions	 really	 do	 count	 as	 harms,	 or	 injustices,	 in	 the	 same	way	 as	
‘standard’	 individual	 violations	 of	 that	 widely-shared	 prohibition	 on	 doing	
serious	harm	 to	other	persons,	 the	no-harm	principle.	This	will	be	 taken	up	 in	
Section	III.	
In	any	case,	it	is	more	plausible	that	we	have	a	central	interest	in	being	able	to	
have	and	experience	a	relationship	with	a	child,	than	that	we	need	to	be	able	to	
have	unlimited	children	in	order	to	flourish.	(Conly	2005:	107;	Cripps	2016a:	6-
8).	Thus,	on	a	modified	view,	it	would	still	be	an	injustice	to	have	more	than	one	
or	two	children.		
A	 third	 objection	 to	 the	 claim	 that	 Broome	 must	 consider	 procreation	 an	
injustice	is	that	overall	emissions	will	not	increase	if	the	child’s	net	emissions	–	
and	those	of	any	future	descendants	–	are	zero.	Thus,	a	parent	can	avoid	injustice	
by	 guaranteeing	 this.	 But	 this	 is	 problematic.	 Children	will	 grow	up	 and	make	
their	 own	 decisions.	 Parents	 can	 educate	 and	 encourage	 them,	 but	 they	 can’t	
guarantee	that	they	will	not	emit	or	procreate	and	they	can’t	offset	for	unlimited	
																																																								
12	Whether	this	requires	biological	parenting	is	another	question,	but	it	cannot	be	taken	for	
granted	that	it	does	not.	
13	A	related	objection	–	that	interference	with	procreation	would	violate	a	human	right,	grounded	
in	 this	 interest	 in	 procreating	 –	 is	misplaced.	 The	 discussion	 here	 is	 entirely	 at	 the	 individual	
level.	 This	 paper	 neither	 makes,	 nor	 accuses	 Broome	 of	 making,	 a	 case	 for	 policy	 to	 enforce	
restraint	from	procreation.	Indeed,	the	argument	is	perfectly	compatible	with	a	collective	or	state	
duty	 to	 bring	 about	 a	 better	 situation	 in	which	 individuals	 can	 procreate	without	 committing	
injustice.		
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emissions.	Even	if	 they	could	do	so	for	this	child,	they	could	not	do	so	for	their	
potential	descendants.14		
A	version	of	this	objection	appeals	to	the	urgency	of	the	collective	challenge.	
Given	that	limiting	risks	across	central	areas	of	concern	will	require	zero	overall	
emissions	by	 the	end	of	 the	century	(IPCC	2014:	18),	effective	collective	action	
would	 have	 to	 ensure	 that	 future	 generations	 have	 no	 carbon	 emissions.	 If	
parents	can	take	this	for	granted,	they	needn’t	consider	their	future	children	as	
future	 emitters.	 But,	 of	 course,	 this	 is	 precisely	what	 they	 cannot	 do.	 Potential	
parents,	like	all	of	us,	face	the	sad	probability	that	the	necessary	collective	action	
won’t	be	achieved.	In	that	case,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	already	great	
harm	would	be	worsened	by	 greater	 ongoing	 emissions.	 (The	 alternative	 is	 an	
implausibly	 all-or-nothing	 view	 on	 which,	 once	 this	 opportunity	 to	 mitigate	
sufficiently	has	been	missed,	the	situation	will	be	so	dire	anyway	that	it	no	longer	
matters	what	our	combined	emissions	are:	 the	kind	of	 reasoning	 that	says	one	
might	 as	 well	 light	 a	 cigarette	 once	 the	 house	 is	 on	 fire.)	 Then,	 on	 Broome’s	
account,	individual	carbon	footprints	would	still	count	as	harms.		
Perhaps	the	point	is	not	that	the	parent	can’t	guarantee	that	her	child	will	not	
emit,	or	have	children	in	her	turn,	but	that	it	will	be	that	child’s	choice	to	do	so,	
and	so	her	 (not	her	parents’)	 responsibility.	After	all,	we	do	not	generally	hold	
criminals’	 parents	 responsible	 for	 their	 crimes	 simply	 because	 they	 produced	
them.	 However,	 children	 may	 not	 actually	 have	 that	 option,	 given	 continued	
failure	 to	 act	 collectively	 on	 climate	 change.	 Zero	 net	 emissions	 is	 a	 realistic	
option	for	Broome’s	current	affluent	readers	only	because	of	the	availability	and	
affordability	of	offsets.		
Whether	 or	 not	 these	 future	 adults	 could	 avoid	 emitting	 –	 and	 I	 am	 not	
suggesting	that	they	will	not	be	responsible	for	any	of	their	emissions	choices	–	
they	can,	on	current	patterns,	be	predicted	to	have	a	significant	carbon	footprint.	
The	analogy	with	the	criminal	fails:	most	children	will	not	grow	up	to	be	thieves	
or	 murderers,	 but	 parents	 in	 this	 unique	 situation	 create	 the	 probability	 of	
																																																								
14	A	rival	suggestion	would	be	‘offsetting’	by	funding	others	not	to	have	children.	This	might	seem	
a	natural	extension	of	the	tradable	procreation	rights	sometimes	mooted	(De	La	Croix	and	
Gosseries	2009).	However,	it	seems	doubly	problematic.	On	a	one-for-one	basis	it	would	be	
ineffective:	any	such	cuts	in	population	growth	are	likely	to	be	in	the	developing	world,	where	
per	capita	emissions	are	dramatically	lower.	Moreover,	whatever	moral	concerns	arise	regarding	
emissions	offsetting	in	general	multiply	a	hundredfold	in	this	peculiarly	morally	charged	context.		
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emissions	 by	 creating	 the	 agent	 who	 will	 probably	 go	 on	 to	 cause	 them	
(including	by	having	children	 in	 their	 turn).	They	knowingly	 run	a	high	 risk	of	
increasing	overall	emissions.	And	for	Broome,	significant	risks	of	harms	count	as	
injustices	(2012:	79).		
However,	 one	 important	 caveat	 must	 be	 acknowledged,	 regarding	 parents’	
responsibility	 for	 emitting	 descendants.	 In	 general,	 as	 strings	 of	 consequences	
grow,	 it	 becomes	 less	 plausible	 to	 assign	 moral	 responsibility	 for	 all	 those	
consequences	to	those	whose	actions	started	the	chain.	This	is	partly	because	of	
other	 agents’	 actions	 and	 natural	 events	 in	 between,	 partly	 because	 we	
standardly	 only	 hold	 persons	 responsible	 for	 consequences	 reasonably	
foreseeable	when	 they	acted.	While	 it	 is	 reasonable	 for	a	parent	 to	expect	 that	
her	 children	will	 a)	 emit	 and	b)	have	 children	who	will	 emit,	 it	may	not	 be	 so	
reasonable	to	assume	this	of	her	more	distant	descendants.		
On	 a),	 our	 ability	 to	 predict	 technological	 progress,	 and/or	 collective-level	
policy,	 is	 too	 limited	to	extrapolate	current	trends	beyond	a	generation	or	two.	
On	b),	the	chain	of	procreation	relies	on	certain	decisions	(and	abilities)	at	every	
generation.	There	is	also	the	chance,	at	each	stage,	of	some	destructive	external	
event.	 Generally	 speaking,	 it	 seems	 reasonable	 to	 draw	 the	 line	 for	 any	
responsibility	for	future	emissions	(at	the	least)	at	the	point	at	which	it	becomes	
less	 likely	 that	 someone	will	 have	 further	 emitting	descendants	 than	 that	 they	
will	not.	Of	course,	 it	will	be	almost	 impossible	 to	pinpoint	when	this	 is.	 It	will	
also	 vary	 significantly	 according	 to	 how	 many	 children	 someone	 has.	 The	
argument	of	this	section	would	hold,	however,	for	at	least	a	few	generations.	
Another	 objection	 to	 my	 expansion	 of	 Broome’s	 view	 appeals	 to	 parents’	
influence	over	their	children.	The	suggestion	is	that	those	potential	parents	who	
are	likely	to	take	seriously	a	moral	injunction	not	to	procreate	are	also	those	who	
would	 be	 likely	 to	 bring	 up	 their	 children	 to	 be	 environmentally	 aware.	 The	
claim	then,	would	be	that	these	are	precisely	the	kind	of	people	who	ought	to	be	
peopling	the	next	generation.		
This	 can	 be	 rejected.	 Recall	 that	 Broome	 is	 concerned	 narrowly	 with	 the	
individual	 injustice	 of	 having	 a	 positive	 net	 carbon	 footprint.	 The	 argument	
would	 have	 to	 be	 that	 ‘right-minded’	 parents	 could	 produce	 children	 so	
personally	 conscientious	and	 so	effective	at	motivating	others	 that	 it	would	be	
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better	to	have	them	than	not,	in	overall	emissions	terms.	But	parental	influence,	
while	important,	cannot	do	everything.	Moreover,	many	who	currently	consider	
themselves	 ‘green’	 have	 failed	 to	 achieve	 a	 zero	 carbon	 footprint.	 It	 would	
hardly,	then,	be	realistic,	to	expect	one’s	potential	child	to	go	so	far	beyond	this	as	
to	 have,	 in	 effect,	 a	 negative	 footprint.	 And	 while	 we	 undoubtedly	 need	
exceptional	 leaders	to	turn	the	tide	of	collective	 lethargy	on	climate	change,	no	
parent	could	reasonably	gamble	on	her	own	child	being	one.	
A	 final	objection	appeals	 to	Broome’s	 rejection	of	 the	 intuition	of	neutrality:	
the	view	that	we	can	be	morally	neutral	about	the	number	of	flourishing	people	
brought	 into	 the	 world	 whilst	 considering	 it	 morally	 important	 that	 whoever	
does	exist	can	flourish	(2012:	170-88).15		This	could	imply	a	duty	of	goodness	to	
procreate,	 so	 long	 as	 the	 presence	 of	 an	 extra	 person	 did	 not	 reduce	 overall	
happiness	more	 than	her	own	would	add	 to	 it.	At	 the	 individual	 level,	 this	 can	
quickly	be	rejected.	On	Broome’s	common	sense	morality,	duties	of	justice	have	
priority	for	the	private	individual.		
However,	 important	 related	 questions	 are	 raised.	 If	 there	 were	 a	 duty	 to	
refrain	from	having	any	children,	and	if	all	complied	with	this	duty	(which	is,	of	
course,	 improbable),	 the	 consequences	would	be	devastating:	 even	more	 so,	 at	
least	 from	 an	 anthropocentric	 viewpoint,	 than	 those	 of	 everyone	 failing	 to	
comply	with	 other	 climate	 duties.	 Again,	 on	 the	 Broomian	model,	 this	 doesn’t	
change	 the	 individual	duty.	However,	 is	hard	not	 to	 see	 this	 itself	 as	 reason	 to	
revisit	 either	 the	 absolute	 priority	 of	 justice	 over	 goodness	 at	 the	 individual	
level,	 or	 the	 focus	 on	 climate	 change	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 direct	 individual	
responsibility	for	harm.		
	
III.	CLIMATE	CHANGE	AND	INDIVIDUAL	HARM	
	
So	 far,	 two	 unacknowledged	 implications	 of	 Broome’s	 argument	 have	 been	
outlined.	These	might	be	left	constructive	amendments	to	his	project,	at	 least	if	
the	procreative	duty	of	justice	could	be	consistently	interpreted	as	one	to	stop	at	
																																																								
15	I	will	not	engage	with	Broome’s	argument	for	this	rejection.	Nor	is	 it	within	the	scope	of	this	
paper	to	address	what	else	he	says	about	population	in	the	context	of	governmental	duties:	his	
favourable	 mention	 of	 tying	 state	 emissions	 quotas	 to	 fixed	 population	 levels	 (2012:	 71.	 See	
Cripps	2016b	on	the	latter.)		
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one	or	two	children,	rather	than	not	have	any	at	all.		But	I	will	not	leave	it	at	that,	
because	 there	 remains	 an	underlying	 concern	about	Broome’s	 characterisation	
of	 individual’s	moral	 relationship	 to	 the	 harm	 caused	 through	 climate	 change.	
This	 is	 a	 challenge	 which,	 in	 their	 different	 ways,	 both	 the	 previous	 sections	
press	on	us.		
For	clarity,	let	us	separate	his	view	into	four	points:		
	
1. That,	 as	 affluent	 individuals,	 we	 are	 each	 causally	 responsible	 for	 harms	
through	our	own	emissions,	amounting	to	six	months’	loss	of	human	life.	
2. That	this	 is	 the	kind	of	harm	that	violates	the	 individual	no-harm	principle	
and	counts	as	an	injustice.	
3. That,	 accordingly,	 each	 of	 us	 has	 a	 duty	 of	 justice	 to	 stop	 or	 negate	 those	
individual	emissions	
4. That	 this	duty	 takes	priority	over	any	duties	of	goodness	we	have,	 such	as	
our	duty	to	promote	government	action	on	climate	change	(2012:	54-57,	64-
68,	74-81).	
	
I	will	begin	with	some	 independent	concerns	about	point	(4),	 then	address	 the	
first	three,	before	returning	briefly	to	(4).	
Broome’s	view	is	that	governments	can	legitimately	prioritise	goodness	over	
justice	(so	 long	as	 they	compensate	where	possible),	but	 individuals	can	rarely	
do	so.	In	the	climate	change	context,	this	is	at	least	partly	because	governments,	
unlike	 individuals,	 can	 make	 a	 very	 great	 difference	 to	 what	 happens	 at	 the	
collective	 level	 (2012:	 64-69).	 I	 have	 already	 suggested	 that,	 as	 regards	 some	
individuals,	 this	 depiction	 of	 powerlessness	 may	 be	 a	 mistake.	 I	 now	want	 to	
make	a	more	general	point:	in	focusing	only	on	what	governments	can	do	and	on	
what	individuals	can	do	as	individuals	(cutting	their	own	emissions	as	a	matter	of	
justice	or	lobbying	their	government	as	a	matter	of	goodness),	there	is	a	danger	
of	neglecting	a	third	possibility.	This	is	what	can,	and	in	the	climate	change	case	
can	only,	be	achieved	through	collective	action	at	a	level	at	which	there	is	as	yet	
no	effective	collective	agency.	
This	 is	 important	 in	 at	 least	 two	ways.	 Firstly,	 even	 individual	governments	
may	be	powerless	without	cooperation	with	others	(Gardiner	2011:	95-96).	This	
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might	 involve	 a	 global	 agreement	 (for	 example,	 the	 cap	 and	 trade	 scheme	
suggested	 by	 Broome	 (2012:	 68-72))	 and/or	 establishing	 a	 global	 institution.	
Secondly,	potential	groupings	of	individuals,	beyond	our	current	groupings	into	
states,	could	make	a	very	great	difference	 indeed.	This	might	be	by	collectively	
demanding	 global	 institutional	 change	 or	 through	 global	 citizens’	 activism	
networks,	changing	emissions	patterns	(Jamieson	2011:	36).		
Thus,	the	possibility	arises	of	a	shared	duty	requiring	everyone	(or	all	affluent	
persons)	 to	cooperate	to	achieve	global	climate	action.	Given	the	extraordinary	
moral	salience	of	that	end,	a	case	might	be	made	for	prioritising	individual	duties	
to	bring	about	such	cooperation	over	any	individual	duty	to	neutralise	individual	
emissions	 in	 isolation,	 so	 long	 as	 the	 ultimate	 collective	 scheme	 also	
compensated	any	victims	of	injustice	where	necessary	and	possible.16		
Now	 let	 us	 turn	 to	 points	 (1)	 and	 (2).	 My	 objection	 is	 not	 to	 Broome’s	
calculations,	based	on	World	Health	Organisation	estimates	of	the	toll	of	climate	
change.	It	is	to	his	doing	them	at	all:	to	the	reduction	of	an	aggregate	harm	to	the	
individual	 level.	We	can	get	at	 this	 concern	 in	 two	ways:	 resisting	point	 (1)	by	
questioning	 his	 ‘divvying	 up’	 of	 total	 impact	 to	 conclude	 that	 each	 contributor	
has	effectively	caused	climate	change	amounting	to	a	six	months’	loss	of	human	
life;	 or	 rejecting	 (2)	 by	 resisting	 the	 summing	 of	 imperceptible	 harms	 across	
different	victims	 to	make	 that	 six	months’	 loss	a	violation	of	 the	 individual	no-
harm	principle.	
On	the	challenge	to	(1),	which	has	been	made	elsewhere,17	 I	will	simply	 flag	
up	the	distinction	between	a	number	of	individuals	performing	actions	harmful	
in	 themselves	 which	 add	 up	 to	 greater	 harm,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 individuals	
performing	 actions	 which	 make	 no	 difference	 at	 all	 in	 isolation	 but,	 in	
combination,	 bring	 about	 serious	 harm.	 To	 assess	 this	 latter	 as	 individually-
caused	harm,	the	argument	must	appeal	to	the	chance	that	any	given	individual	
contribution	will	trigger	some	threshold	at	which	harm	is	increased	(Hiller	2011;	
																																																								
16	As	clarified	elsewhere	(Cripps	2013:	115-39),	I	am	not	suggesting	that	individuals	shouldn’t	cut	
their	own	emissions.	The	point	here	is	that	reducing	them	to	zero	is	not	necessarily	the	only	or	
the	best	way	to	fulfil	duties	relating	to	such	collective	harm.	In	practice,	of	course,	the	two	ends	
might	not	conflict.	Cutting	individual	emissions	might	a	way	to	promote	wider	action.	If	 it	were	
not,	affluent	individuals	could	use	offsetting	to	do	both.	However,	if	either	offsetting	or	restraint	
were	costlier,	it	could	pull	against	promoting	collective	action.		
17	Jamieson	2014.	See	also	Cripps	2013:	119-24;	Maltais	2013;	Nolt	2011.		
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Kagan	2011):	of	being,	as	it	were,	that	additional	straw	which	breaks	the	camel’s	
back.		
Instead,	I	will	begin	my	current	critique	at	(2).	For	the	sake	of	argument,	I	will	
accept	 Broome’s	 claim	 that	 the	 individual	 makes	 some	 difference	 to	 what	
happens	 at	 the	 collective	 level,	 concede	 his	 six-months	 figure	 as	 a	 reasonable	
estimate,	and	focus	on	whether	this	violates	the	moral	 injunction	against	doing	
serious	 harm	 to	 any	 other	 person.	 If	 not,	 this	 could	 still	 be	 an	 ‘injustice’.	
However,	 it	 would	 be	 one	 for	 a	 different	 reason	 than	 that	 it	 violates	 the	
individual	no-harm	principle,	and	so	need	not	automatically	give	rise	to	the	same	
duties.	
The	 issue	 is	 this:	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 depriving	 one	
person	of	six	months	of	life,	and	causing	the	loss	of	six	months	of	healthy	human	
life	spread	across	so	many	people	that	each	one	loses	only	the	most	infinitesimal	
fraction	of	a	second,	which	is	how	Broome	characterises	the	situation	(2012:	75-
6).	Broome	defends	his	approach	as	follows:	
	
[A]	 great	 many	 minuscule,	 imperceptible	 harms	 add	 up	 to	 a	 serious	 harm.	 If	 you	
doubt	 that,	 think	 of	 the	 recipients	 of	 harm.	 Each	 one	 receives	 harm	 from	 the	
emissions	 of	 billions	 of	 people.	 The	 amount	 each	 receives	 from	 each	 emitter	 is	
minuscule	and	imperceptible.	Yet	some	recipients	are	already	suffering	serious	harm	
in	 total.	 Some	 are	 even	 being	 killed	 by	 global	warming.	 This	 shows	 that	 adding	 up	
vast	 numbers	 of	 miniscule	 amounts	 can	 amount	 to	 a	 serious	 harm.	 Similarly,	
although	each	emitter	harms	each	recipient	only	imperceptibly,	the	amounts	add	up.	
(2012:	75-76.)	
	
However,	this	glosses	together	two	ways	of	summing	harms:	summing	what	all	
the	contributors,	including	me,	do	to	each	victim,	and	summing	what	I	do	to	each	
of	those	affected.	The	fact	that	both	yield	a	significant	total	harm	does	not	show	
what	 is	 needed	 to	 invoke	 the	 individual	 no-harm	 principle:	 that	 I	 cause	
significant	 harm	 to	 any	 one	 person.	 So	 long	 as	 we	 think	 only	 qua	 private	
individual,	there	remains	the	objection	that	what	I	do	doesn’t	cause	anybody	to	
suffer	anything.	Thus	it	is	necessary	either	to	accept	that	an	imperceptible	harm	
can	 violate	 the	 no-harm	principle,18	 or	 to	 consider	 all	 contributions	 to	 serious	
																																																								
18	See	Parfit’s	‘Single	Torturer’	(1984:	81-2). 
	 16	
harm	 to	 be	 individual	 injustices,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 they	 are	 harmful	 in	
themselves.	(This	amounts,	in	effect,	to	picking	up	where	denying	(1)	would	have	
left	us.)	In	either	case,	I	suggest,	the	step	to	(3),	above,	can	be	questioned.	
Consider	the	possibility	that	contributions	to	serious	harm	count	as	individual	
injustices.19	 But	which	 contributions,	 and	 under	what	 circumstances?	 It	would	
surely	be	too	restrictive	for	a	code	of	private	morality	to	rule	out	all	acts	which	
could	combine	to	cause	great	harms	if	others	also	did	them.	A	relevant	question	
must	 be	 whether	 others	 will	 or	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 do	 so.	 But	 if	 this	 sort	 of	
‘injustice’	 arises	 only	 because	 of	 how	 others	 act	 and	 how	 the	 consequences	 of	
these	actions	combine	with	those	of	the	private	individual,	must	that	individual’s	
exclusive,	 or	 even	primary,	 correlative	 duty	 be	 to	 refrain	 from	performing	her	
own	 action?	 Instead,	 faced	 with	 such	 ‘new	 harms’,	 collective	 action	 might	 be	
needed	to	fulfil	duties	of	justice	(Cripps	2013:	68-77;	Lichtenberg	2010).	This	is	
in	no	way	to	undermine	the	moral	seriousness	of	the	case:	each	individual	must	
respond	 appropriately	 to	 the	 situation	 in	 which	 she	 and	 others	 are	 bringing	
about	 a	 very	 great	 harm	 between	 them.	 However,	 she	 might	 do	 this	 by	
promoting	collective	action	to	prevent	that	harm.		
Even	if	an	imperceptible	harm	does	violate	the	no-harm	principle,	grounding	a	
prima	 facie	 duty	 to	 refrain,	 this	 is	 so	 far	 from	 the	 classic	 case	 of	 serious,	
foreseeable	individual	harm	–	when	individual	A	kills	individual	B	–	as	arguably	
to	require	revisiting	the	all-trumping	status	of	 the	principle.	 Indeed,	given	how	
indirect	the	link	is	between	the	individual	actions	and	any	significant	harm,	it	is	
again	 unclear	why	 the	 duty	 to	 refrain	 should	 be	 the	 only	 or	 even	 the	 primary	
duty	 of	 justice,	 if	 other	 courses	 of	 action	 could	 contribute	more	 effectively	 to	
preventing	 or	 redressing	 that	 significant,	 combined	 harm.	 It	 is	 also	 unclear,	
reinforcing	 the	 case	 against	 (4)	 above,	 why	 any	 duty	 to	 refrain	 should	 take	
priority	over	any	and	all	duties	of	goodness.	Again,	this	is	in	no	way	to	deny	that	
the	 situation	 imposes	 some	 strong,	 negatively-grounded	moral	 duty:	 this	 is	 no	
easy	way	out	for	the	individual.	
This	completes	the	case	against	Broome’s	points	(1)	to	(3).	Note	also	that	the	
points	 just	 raised	 can	 reinforce	my	 tentative	 conclusions	 on	 (4),	 by	 taking	 the	
																																																								
19 This links to an extensive literature. E.g. Cripps	2013:	119-39;	Otsuka	1991;	Parfit	1984:	67-86;	
Spiekermann	2014.	
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sting	 from	 one	 probable	 worry	 about	 that	 view.	 It	 is	 deep-rooted	 in	 common	
sense	morality	that	individuals	cannot	justify	harm	to	other	individuals	by	doing	
(even	much	greater)	good	in	another	way.	Were	my	suggestion	the	general	one	
that	individuals	might	sometimes	legitimately	prioritise	an	obligation	to	promote	
almost	 untold	 collective	 good	 over	 fulfilling	 duties	 not	 to	 harm,	 it	would	 have	
dangerous	 implications.	 (What	 if	 my	 duty	 to	 bring	 about	 collective	 action	 on	
climate	 change	 were	 fulfillable	 by	 assassinating	 oil	 industry	 leaders?	Would	 I	
seriously	want	 to	 defend	 this?)	 However,	 I	 hope	 the	 distinction	 remains	 clear	
between	contributions	to	combined	harms,	which	are	not	perceptibly	harmful	in	
isolation,	 and	 actions	which	are	 individually	 harmful.	 The	points	made	 against	
(4)	are	limited	to	instances	of	the	former.	
	
In	the	light	of	what	has	just	been	said,	I	can	better	indicate	why	some	measures	
proposed	 in	Section	I	are	morally	viable	alternatives	to	conventional	offsetting,	
and	suggest	that	some,	at	least,	might	be	more	appropriate	even	than	individual	
emissions	cuts.		
Recall	Gardiner’s	Wayne,	who	exposes	his	wife	to	the	risk	of	STDs	and	tries	to	
justify	 himself	 by	 investing	 in	 uncertain	medical	 research.	 The	 analogy	 fits	 us	
depressingly	well	as	a	generation	or	global	elite,	as	we	flail	around	for	ever	more	
speculative	measures	to	avoid	cutting	luxury	emissions.	But	the	individual	is	not	
Wayne.	She	and	others	are	causing	great	harm	in	combination;	she	is	not	directly	
causing	it	to	any	one	victim.	This	situation	makes	a	strong,	negative	moral	claim	
on	 her,	 but	 one	 that	 could	 be	 as	 appropriately	 or	 effectively	 met	 by	 funding	
adaptation	 or	 green	 technology	 research,	 both	 of	 which	 counter	 some	 of	 that	
combined	harm,	as	by	preventative	offsetting,	which	does	 the	 same.	Moreover,	
some	 individual	 investments	 in	 adaptation	or	 green	 technology	 research	 could	
prevent	 perceptible	 harm	 to	 individual	 victims	 (at	 least	 if	 the	 technology	
investment	 involves	 a	 big	 enough	 contribution,	 spread	 widely	 enough).	 The	
individual	 cannot	 do	 this	 simply	 by	 buying	 carbon	 removal	 offsets,	 or	 even	
refraining	from	individual	emissions.		
In	promoting	collective	action	to	end	the	overall	harm,	the	individual	could	be	
acting	 still	more	appropriately.	 She	would	be	attempting	 to	broker	a	 collective	
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solution	 to	 an	 injustice	 which	 is	 also,	 ultimately,	 collective:	 to	 stop	 us,	 as	 a	
generation,	from	being	Wayne.		
We	 might	 also	 pick	 up	 where	 Section	 II	 left	 us:	 with	 implications	 highly	
counterintuitive	 and,	 if	 collectivised,	 so	 problematic	 as	 to	 give	 us	 prima	 facie	
reason	 to	 question	 the	 view	 of	 individual	 emissions	 and	 harm	 on	 which	 they	
rested.	Now	that	view	has	indeed	been	challenged,	there	is	no	need	to	espouse	a	
stringent	 individual	 duty	 to	 have	no	 children:	 the	 focus	 can	 legitimately	 be	 on	
promoting	 the	 building	 of	 a	 world	 in	 which	 the	 next	 generation	 can	 thrive	
without	emissions.		
However,	 the	 insight	 remains	 that	 procreative	 decisions	 are	 an	 important	
contributor	to	the	overall	catastrophe	of	climate	change.	The	challenge,	then,	 is	
twofold:	to	evaluate	how	the	population	factor	should	be	incorporated	into	any	
collective	response	(a	challenge	exacerbated	 if	we	accept	Broome’s	rejection	of	
the	 intuition	 of	 neutrality);	 and	 to	 determine	 whether	 any	 individual	 duty	 to	
refrain	 from	 procreating	 above	 a	 certain	 number	 of	 children	 can	 be	 defended	
either	as	part	of	such	a	collective	endeavour	or	as	a	necessary	part	of	promoting	
it.	In	providing	a	way	around	the	most	extreme	implications	of	Broome’s	view	of	
individual	justice,	I	am	in	no	way	undermining	the	paramount	importance	of	this	
task.	
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